Abstract-In the present work, we study the advertising competition of several marketing campaigns who need to determine how many resources to allocate to potential customers to advertise their products through direct marketing while taking into account that competing marketing campaigns are trying to do the same. Potential customers rank marketing campaigns according to the offers, promotions or discounts made to them. We consider the network value as a measure of their importance in the market (taking into account their intrinsic value as well as the peer influence that they exert over others) and we find an analytical expression for it. We analyze the marketing campaigns competition from a game theory point of view, finding a closed form expression of the symmetric equilibrium offer strategy for the marketing campaigns from which no campaign has any incentive to deviate. We also present several scenarios, such as Winner-takes-all and Borda, but not the only possible ones for which our results allow us to retrieve in a simple way the corresponding equilibrium strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The digital revolution enhances the importance of direct marketing which advertises products or services by targeting exclusively potential costumers likely to be profitable, instead of the analog mass marketing which advertise products or services to everyone. In the context of direct marketing, Domingos and Richardson [1] introduced the network value of a customer by incorporating the influence of peers on the decision making process of potential customers deciding between different products or services promoted by competing marketing campaigns. If each potential customer makes a buying decision independently of every other potential customer, we should only consider her intrinsic value, i.e. the expected profit from sales to him. However, when we consider the often strong influence potential customers exert on their peers, friends, etc., we have to incorporate this influence to their network value.
In the present work, our focus is on how many resources to allocate to potential customers for them to adopt one marketing campaign versus another while knowing that competing marketing campaigns are trying to do the same. We are interested in the case where several competing marketing campaigns need to simultaneously and independently decide how many resources to allocate to potential customers to advertise their products while most of the state-of-the-art focus in only one challenger marketing campaign competing with one incumbent marketing campaign. The process and dynamics by which influence spread across the network is given by the voter model. 
A. Related Works
Competitive influence in social networks has been studied in other scenarios. Bharathi et al. [2] proposed a generalization of the independent cascade model and gave a (1 − 1/e) approximation algorithm for computing the best response to an already known opponent's strategy. Goyal and Kearns [3] studied the case of two players simultaneously choosing some nodes to initially seed while considering two independent functions for the consumers denoted switching function and selection function. Borodin et al. [4] showed that for a broad family of competitive influence models it is NP-hard to achieve an approximation that is better that the square root of the optimal solution. Chasparis and Shamma [5] found optimal advertising policies using dynamic programming on some particular models of social networks.
Within the general context of competitive contests, there is an extensive literature (see e.g. [6] , [7] ). To study competitive contests, we use recent advances of game theory, and in particular of Colonel Blotto games. The Colonel Blotto game was first solved for the case of two generals and three battlefields by Borel [8] , [9] . For the case of equally valued battlefields (homogeneous battlefields case), this result was generalized for any number of battlefields by Gross and Wagner [6] . Laslier and Picard [10] provided alternative methods to construct the joint distribution by extending the method proposed by Gross and Wagner [6] . Roberson [7] focused on the case of two generals, homogeneous battlefields and different budgets (asymmetric budgets case). Friedman [11] studied the Nash equilibrium and best response function for the asymmetric budgets case with two generals. The case of two generals and where for each distinct battlefield value there are at least three battlefields with the same value was stated and solved by Roberson [12] and Shwartz et al. [13] . In another context, by relaxing the budget constraint and make it to hold asymptotically almost surely instead of with certainty, Myerson [14] found the solution for the case of equally valued battlefields with ranking scores for any number of generals. The first parallels between colonel Blotto games and advertising competitions were done in [11] and in [15] , [16] considering social networks.
B. Our contributions
The main result of this work is that by following Myerson's idea [14] of relaxing the budget constraint and make it to hold asymptotically almost surely instead of with certainty, we are able to find a symmetric equilibrium (every marketing campaign following the same strategy has no incentive to deviate) for the heterogeneous case (where every potential customer has a different value but a common bound) of multiple marketing campaigns. We also find a closed form expression for the network value of potential customers for the voter model with ranking scores.
C. Organization of the work
The plan of this work is as follows. In Section II we describe the model that we are considering. In Section III we give the main results that we have obtained. In Section IV we give simulations on some scenarios. In Section V we conclude and in Section VI we describe future extensions of our work.
II. MODEL
Consider the set of marketing campaigns K = {1, 2, . . . , K} that need to allocate a certain budget (symmetric budgets case), denoted by B, across a set of potential customers V = {1, 2, . . . , N } through offers (promotions or discounts). Each potential customer indicates her preferences according to these offers through a ranking (defined in the following subsection) of the K products or services promoted by the marketing campaigns. We denote by w n the intrinsic value of potential customer n, with a common upper bound w n ≤ U , and we denote by W = n∈V w n the total intrinsic value of the set of potential customers. Similarly, we denote by v n the network value (to be determined) of potential customer n ∈ V and by V = n∈V v n the total network value of the set of potential customers.
Instead of considering a strict budget constraint for each marketing campaign, we follow the work of Myerson [14] and assume that the budget constraint is satisfied asymptotically almost surely. We search for a solution in the marginal distributions of her offers to potential customers.
Each marketing campaign's budget constraint is expressed as a constraint on the average offer per potential customer that a marketing campaign can promise. Specifically, we assume here that each marketing campaign's offer distribution for potential customer n must have mean Bv n /V to be considered credible by potential customer n. The reason for this particular mean to be considered credible is that the budget B should be allocated across N potential customers and each potential customer n has relative value v n /V . Therefore the sum of the offers should be in expectation
With a finite population of N potential customers, and with a fixed budget of B dollars to be allocated, marketing campaign promises could not be independent across all potential customers, because the offers to all potential customers would have to sum the given budget B. However, due to Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers, as the number of potential customers N increases, the sum of independently distributed offers asymptotically almost surely will converge to the budget B. Indeed, if the mean of the campaign's offer distribution for potential customer n ∈ V is given by Bv n /V and the support of the distribution is bounded then, for any small positive number ε, N potential customers' offers that are drawn independently from the campaign's distribution would have probability less than ε of totalling more than (1 + ε) n∈V Bv n /V = B(1 + ε), when N is sufficiently large. Thus, we can assume that each campaign makes independent offers to every potential customer and the budget constraint will hold asymptotically almost surely.
The potential customers and their influence relationships can be modeled as an undirected graph with self-loops G = (V, E) where V is the set of nodes which represent the potential customers and E is the set of edges which represent the mutual influence between potential customers.
Notation.-We denote by |S| the cardinality of set S. We denote by index k one of the marketing campaigns and by index n one of the potential customers. For a potential customer n ∈ V, we denote by N (n) the set of its neighbors in the graph, i.e. N (n) = {m ∈ V : {n, m} ∈ E}.
A. Marketing campaigns payoffs
We consider that each potential customer ranks the set of marketing campaigns K according to their offers to her from highest to lowest. We consider a normalized ranking score 1 characterized by an ordered sequence of K numbers, which we denote by s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s K , where
We consider that each potential customer n ∈ V distributes her value v n across marketing campaigns according to this normalized ranking score s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s K ) as follows:
Thus, potential customer n ∈ V gives the top-ranked marketing campaign a payoff of v n s 1 , the second-ranked marketing campaign v n s 2 , and so on, with the kth ranked marketing campaign getting v n s k for all k ∈ K. Therefore, the payoff distributed is indeed
where the last equality is coming from the normalization of the ranking scores. Each marketing campaign's payoff corresponds to the sum of the payoffs across all potential customers.
B. Intrinsic payoff problem
We consider that time is slotted and without loss of generality we assume that the initial time t 0 = 0. The intrinsic payoff problem consists in considering each potential customer in isolation. We denote by w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N ) the vector of intrinsic values of the potential customers. At the initial time t 0 = 0, for each potential customer n, we consider a ranking function r n which maps a given marketing campaign k to its ranking for that potential customer. For example, if for potential customer n marketing campaign k is her top-ranked marketing campaign and k ′ is her thirdranked marketing campaign then r n (k) = 1 and r n (k ′ ) = 3.
1 This assumption is not restrictive. In fact, any ranking score where s 1 ≥ s 2 ≥ . . . ≥ s K and not all equal can be normalized to fulfill the previous statement. Indeed, let S = K j=1 (s j − s K ). We observe that we can normalize the ranking score as follows
) so that s ′ K = 0 and the sum of the ranking scores S ′ is equal to 1.
We define the intrinsic payoff function for marketing campaign k as
where s rn(k) corresponds to the score of the ranking given to marketing campaign k by potential customer n. The intrinsic payoff problem ignores the ranking changes produced by the evolution of the system (described in the following subsection). Every potential customer is considered in isolation unaffected by the influence of other potential customers for all the successive time steps.
In the next subsection, we incorporate the evolution of the system and the changes that the influence relationships will produce.
C. Network payoff problem
For potential customer n, we define the ranking at time t ≥ 0, denoted by r t n , which for a given marketing campaign k gives the ranking of that marketing campaign for potential customer n at time t. We notice that r 0 n is equivalent to r n . We define the network payoff function for marketing campaign k as π
corresponds to the score of the ranking given to marketing campaign k by potential customer n at time t. We notice that the intrinsic payoff problem is equivalent to solving the network payoff problem at the initial time since the intrinsic payoff ignores the influence relationships between potential customers for all the time steps. Therefore π
D. Evolution of the system
The evolution of the system will be described by the voter model [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , i.e. starting from any arbitrary initial ranking assignment by the potential customers, at each time t ≥ 1, each potential customer picks uniformly at random one of her neighbors and adopts her opinion. This assumption although realistic in the case of two marketing campaigns (the probability of a potential customer adopting one marketing campaign is proportional to the adoption of that marketing campaign between her neighbors) becomes more and more difficult to hold for three or more marketing campaigns. However, we consider this is a first step towards more complex rules of combinations of neighbors' opinions. Instant run-off voting and single transferable voting [21] being two natural candidates for further studies.
III. RESULTS

A. Network value of a customer
We are interested on the network value of a potential customer. Following the steps of [15] , we let M be the normalized transition matrix of the graph G, i.e.
By induction, the probability that a random walk of length t starting at j ends in j ′ is given by the (j, j ′ )-entry of the matrix M t . We notice that in the voter model the probability that potential customer j adopts the opinion of one her neighbors j ′ is precisely 1/|N (j)| = M (j, j ′ ). Equivalently, this is the probability that a random walk of length 1 that starts at j ends up in j ′ . Generalizing this observation [22] by induction on t, we obtain that the probability that after t iterations, potential customer j will adopt the opinion that potential customer j ′ had at time t 0 = 0 is precisely M t (j, j ′ ). By linearity of expectation, the expected network payoff for marketing campaign k at target time τ is given by
Equivalently, the expected network payoff is given by
We call v j ′ the network value of potential customer j ′ at target time τ .
We notice that both eqns. (1) and (2) are similar. The only difference is that one considers the intrinsic value and the other the network value of potential customers. From eqns. (1) and (2), we obtain that after determining the network value of potential customers, the problem of determining the resource allocation that maximizes the expected network payoff is similar to the problem of determining the resource allocation that maximizes the expected intrinsic payoff. Therefore, in the following we restrict ourselves to this problem.
B. Non-simultaneous allocations
In this subsection, we prove that the intrinsic payoff problem is easy to solve in the case where one marketing campaign can observe what competing marketing campaigns are offering and after that makes offers to potential customers. Indeed, even in the case of two marketing campaigns, if marketing campaign 2 could make offers after observing the offers made by marketing campaign 1, then marketing campaign 2 will always be preferred by the most valuable potential customers. For example, marketing campaign 2 could identify a small group of potential customers who are the least valuable between those who are promised strictly positive offers by marketing campaign 1 (e.g. the 5% of the distribution of marketing campaign 1), and offer nothing to this group. Then campaign 2 could offer to every other potential customer slightly more than campaign 1 has promised him, where the excess over campaign 1's offers is financed from the resources not given to the potential customers in the first group. Every potential customer outside of the first small group (5%) would prefer marketing campaign 2, who would win 95% of the most valuable potential customers.
In the following, we assume that both of the marketing campaigns must make their marketing campaign promises simultaneously. We may think of scenarios in which it is important to make the first offers and in which there is a cost of delay by the response to the first offers, but those scenarios are outside the scope of this work.
C. Scale family cumulative distributions
Similar to the relationship between the standard (continuous) uniform distribution U(0, 1) and the general (continuous) uniform distribution U(0, v), for a given cumulative distribution function F with bounded support I = [a, b], we define its general cumulative distribution function G with nonnegative scaling factor v as follows:
We call F the representative of the scale family cumulative distribution.
D. Symmetric equilibrium
A symmetric equilibrium of the marketing campaign competition is a scenario in which every marketing campaign is expected to use the same offer distribution, and each marketing campaign finds that using this offer distribution maximizes its chances of winning when the other marketing campaigns are also simultaneously and independently allocating their offers according to this distribution (and all potential customers perceive that the K marketing campaigns have the same probability of winning). In this work, we focus exclusively on finding such symmetric equilibria and we leave the problem of finding exhaustively all the asymmetric equilibria as a future work.
From the previous subsection, we could represent marketing campaign k's cumulative offer distribution by a scale family cumulative distributions with representative distribution F k with bounded support I = [a, b]. The scaling factor for potential customer n is the value of the potential customer v n . We denote the resulting cumulative distribution function as
Each offer distribution for potential customer n ∈ V must have mean Bv n /V and so F k n must be a non-decreasing function that satisfies In the following, we prove that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of this form.
Consider the situation faced by a given marketing campaign k when it chooses its offer distribution, assuming that every other marketing campaign will use the equilibrium offer distribution. When marketing campaign k offers x to potential customer n, the probability that this marketing campaign k will be ranked in position j by potential customer n is given by P (j, F n (x)) where we let
That is, P (j, q) denotes the probability that exactly j − 1 of the K − 1 competing marketing campaigns will offer more than x, given that each other marketing campaign has an independent probability q of offering less than x to this potential customer. If marketing campaign k offers x to potential customer n, then the expected value that this potential customer will give to this marketing campaign is R n (F n (x)) where
Things could be more difficult if there were a positive probability of other marketing campaigns offering exactly x, but we can ignore such complications because we will prove (see Lemma 1) that the equilibrium distribution cannot assign positive probability to any single point. When all marketing campaigns independently use the same offer distribution, they must all get the same expected score from potential customer n which must equal v n /K.
Theorem 1: In a K-marketing campaign competition under the normalized ranking score (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s K ) and values (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v N ), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the marketing campaigns' game. In this equilibrium, each marketing campaign chooses to generate offers according to a scale family cumulative distribution with scale parameter v n for potential customer n, that has support on the interval from 0 to s 1 KBv n /V , and which has a cumulative distribution F (·) that satisfies the equation
The proof follows the steps of Theorem 2 in [14] . The following is a constructive proof and we decompose the proof in the next following lemmas.
Lemma 1: If there is a symmetric equilibrium distribution of offers, it must be continuous, i.e. it cannot have any points of positive probability.
Lemma 2: We have that R n is a continuous and strictly increasing function over the interval from 0 to 1 and
Lemma 3: The lowest permissible offer 0 must be in the support of the equilibrium distribution of offers.
Lemma 4: There is some positive constant α such that R n (F n (x)) = αx.
Lemma 5: We have that the constant α = V /KB. From the previous lemma, the support of the F n distribution is the interval from 0 to s 1 v n /α = s 1 KBv n /V , and the cumulative distribution satisfies the formula
Lemma 6: F n is an equilibrium. Lemmas 1-6 are the proof of Theorem 1 and their proofs can be found in the technical report [23] . The previous theorem provides us a method to obtain explicitly the cumulative offer distribution functions under different ranking scores.
IV. SIMULATIONS
Winner-takes-all.-We notice that our result generalizes the existing result on pairwise competitions between marketing campaigns [13] by relaxing the budget constraint. This is useful because in most situations a pairwise competition result is not what is needed. One example is the case where each customer chooses to buy from one marketing campaign and being the second choice doesn't give any profit to the remaining marketing campaigns. Indeed, consider three competing marketing campaigns X, Y , and Z with a budget of $100 and five equally valuable customers. Consider the offer (discount) strategies x = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20) , y = (0, 0, 0, 50, 50), z = (50, 50, 0, 0, 0). In the pairwise competition, marketing campaign X captures 3 out of 5 customers to Y (the first three), 3 out of 5 customers to Z (the last three), thus winning in a pairwise competition against both marketing campaigns. However, since each customer will only choose one marketing campaign from her three choices X, Y and Z, the final outcome will be 2 customers for Y , 2 customers for Z, and only 1 customer for X. This is therefore quite different from a pairwise competition. We call this situation "winner-takesall". This case can be modeled in our result as follows. The normalized ranking scores are s 1 = 1, s 2 = 0, . . . , s K = 0. From eqns. (3) and (4), we obtain that R n (q) = v n P (1, q) = v n q K−1 . Therefore from eq. (5) of Theorem 1 the equilibrium cumulative distribution satisfies
, and thus
When K = 2 we recover the result of [13] for pairwise competitions. Figure 1(a) gives us the equilibrium offer distribution when we consider that the total value of the customers is $20 000, the budget of each marketing campaign is $1 000 for three different competing scenarios:
• there are 2 marketing campaigns and the average value of a customer is $1 000; • there are 4 marketing campaigns and the average value of a customer is $500; • there are 6 marketing campaigns and the average value of a customer is $333.
The parameters were chosen to allow us to compare the three scenarios over the same support. We observe that when there are two competing marketing campaigns, the equilibrium offers are made uniformly at random over the support interval from $0 to $100. However, increasing the number of competing marketing campaigns, we observe that marketing campaigns offers are skewed offering less than the average to most of the potential customers while offering much more than the average for a reduced number of potential customers.
In particular, for four marketing campaigns, more than 50% of the potential customers receive offers of less than $14 (the average offer is $25). This effect is even more pronounced for six marketing campaigns where more than 50% of potential customers receive offers of less than $4 (the average offer is $17).
Borda.-Another interesting case is when the ranking score is linearly decreasing with the ranking (we denote it Borda for its similarity to Borda ranking votes). For example, it can be given by s 1 = (K − 1)/S, s 2 = (K − 2)/S, s 3 = (K − 3)/S, . . . , s K = 0, with a normalizing constant S = K j=1 s j = K(K − 1)/2. From eqns. (3) and (4), the function R n (q) is given by
where we have made the change of variable K ′ = K − 1 and use the formula of the expected value of a binomial distribution.
Thus, from eq. (5) of Theorem 1,
Therefore, the equilibrium offer distribution under this rule is a uniform distribution over the interval from 0 to 2Bv n /V . We notice that the equilibrium offer distribution is independent of the number of competing marketing campaigns K. Figure 1(b) gives us the equilibrium offer distribution when we consider that the total value of the customers is $20 000, the budget for each marketing campaign is $1 000, the average value of a customer is $1 000 and we consider three scenarios with K = 2, K = 4, and K = 6.
We observe that in these three scenarios the symmetric equilibrium offer distribution is uniformly distributed over the support interval from 0 to $100 and it is independent on the number of competing marketing campaigns.
The previously considered scenarios, Winner-takes-all and Borda, are two out of many possible scenarios that can be analyzed and to which our previous results can be applied.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we studied advertising competitions in social networks. In particular, we analyzed the scenario of several marketing campaigns determining to which potential customers to market and how many resources to allocate to these potential customers while taking into account that competing marketing campaigns are trying to do the same.
As a consequence of social network dynamics, the importance of every potential customer in the market can be expressed in terms of her network value which is a measure of the influence exerted among her peers and friends and of which we provided an analytical expression for the voter model of social networks.
Defining ranking scores for potential customers and using tools from game theory, we have given a closed form expression of the symmetric equilibrium offer strategy for the marketing campaigns from which no campaign has any interesting to deviate. Moreover, we presented some interesting out of many possible scenarios to which our results can be applied. (a) Winner-takes-all symmetric equilibrium offer distributions when we consider a budget of $1 000, K = 2 and 20 customers of average value $1 000; K = 4 and 40 customers of average value $500; and K = 6 and 60 customers of average value $333. 
VI. EXTENSIONS
Besides the already mentioned extensions, there are numerous other interesting extensions to this work. A natural extension is to consider different budgets for different marketing campaigns. This would correspond to the asymmetric budgets case which was first treated by Friedman [11] in the case of two marketing campaigns who simplified the game by assuming that the budgets constraints hold in expectation. For the case of asymmetric marketing campaigns, Robertson [7] provides a characterization by assuming that for each value of a potential customer, there are at least three equally valued potential customers. The case of asymmetric marketing campaigns with heterogeneous potential customers is an open question. Another interesting extension could consider that the value of potential customers is different for different marketing campaigns. Besides the partial results of [24] which only considers very partial solutions where a pure equilibrium exists the general question is still open.
